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Abstract
Cost equalisation, which redistributes income from low to high cost sub-national regions,
is practised in many unitary and federal countries as part of broader schemes designed to
equalise fiscal capacities. While these policies are motivated by equity, in this paper I show
that under plausible circumstances cost equalisation enhances economic efficiency. The
rationale for this striking result has to do with the way that cost differences across regions
interact with externalities caused by migration and the role of inter-regional transfers as a
corrective instrument. By providing an efficiency rationale for cost equalisation, the paper
builds a more effective bridge between the theory and practice of fiscal equalisation.
Key Words: federalism, intergovernmental relations, inter-governmental differentials and
their effects, federal state relations.
JEL: H73, H77.
1 Introduction
A survey of fiscal equalisation by Blochliger and Charbit (2008) identified eighteen countries
undertaking cost equalisation between sub-national regions. Of these, ten are unitary states
which include the United Kingdom, Sweden, Japan and Norway.1 The rest are federal/regional
countries such as Germany, Canada, Australia, Italy and Mexico. Most countries operate
schemes of vertical cost equalisation whereby the central government adjusts the provision of
sub-national services to account for higher cost, though in some -Australia, Norway and Sweden
- it is overtly horizontal.
Conceptually, cost equalisation can arise from two sources. One takes account of differences
across jurisdictions in the per unit cost of providing local public goods due to economies of
scale, production technology and input costs. For example, the Australian system takes into
account inter-regional differences in wage rates for public servants and scale economies. Another
source adjusts for inter-regional public good cost differences arising from expenditure needs
caused by socio-demographic features of local populations, density/dispersion or remoteness.
In practice, equalisation schemes often include both aspects of cost equalisation using a costed
1See Table 4, page 13, of their paper.
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norms approach to estimating inter-jurisdictional cost differences (see Reschovsky (2007)). With
this approach, only those cost differences outside of local control are subject to cost equalisation.
Generally speaking, cost equalisation is conducted as part of broader fiscal capacity equal-
isation schemes which include revenue equalisation. Fiscal equalisation aims to equalise the
fiscal capacity of disparate regions. If full equalisation is achieved, each region is able to provide
the same standard of services to its citizens while imposing the same tax burden. Therefore,
traditionally cost equalisation has its rational in notions of inter-regional equity, not efficiency.
The net effect of cost equalisation, whether it derives from regional differences in input
costs or expenditure needs, or takes a horizontal or vertical form, is to redistribute income
from low to high cost jurisdictions. Its redistributive effect is often as large in numerical terms
as the redistribution resulting from revenue equalisation and can make up one to two percent
of a sub-national region’s output. This makes the question of whether cost equalisation has
efficiency costs (or benefits) an important one. As economists, we might reasonably conjecture
that it has efficiency costs. A policy which transfers income and encourages migration from
low to high cost jurisdictions would seem to be inefficient since it encourages more output of
relatively high cost local services. Surely, on economic efficiency grounds the preferred policy is
to encourage labour and capital to locate in low cost regions? This view prevails in the fiscal
federalism literature. It is nicely summarized by Albouy (2012) who writes that with regard to
local public good prices ‘....variations in these prices due either to factor costs or production
efficiency are to be ignored. When prices are set efficiently, they represent the opportunity cost
of scarce factors for producing tradeable output. Subsidising households to live in areas where
providing local services costs more ignores these opportunity costs and leads to inefficient use
of scare factors’2.
In this paper, I seek to convince the reader that in a world of labour migration externalities,
which call for corrective inter-regional transfers, the opposite is, in fact, true. Specifically, I
set out to show that there are highly plausible circumstances under which cost equalisation in
favour of high cost regions, as we see in the practice of equalisation, is efficiency enhancing.
This striking and apparently counter-intuitive result contrasts with the dominant view that
cost equalisation in favour of high costs states is inefficient. It also provides theoretical support
for what we see in practice - cost equalisation programs which redistribute income from low to
high cost regions to equalise fiscal capacities. In this sense, I hope my results provide something
of a firmer bridge between the theory of equalisation and its practice. If, indeed, my result is
correct, then I have a case where efficiency and equity goals are one and the same - equalising
fiscal capacities is also efficiency enhancing.
To explain the idea, I develop an efficiency-in-migration model of a federation which is
entirely standard (see Boadway (2004) for a survey). An important feature of these models is
that, in contrast to a Tiebout world, free migration creates externalities which can be corrected
for by an inter-state transfer. Within this framework, I suppose two states and a federal agency
play a three stage game with Nash conjectures. The timing of moves is the same as in Caplan
2See Albouy (2012) page 827.
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et al. (2000). Hence, states move first as Stackleberg leaders to choose provision of congested
local public goods to maximise within-state welfare subject to feasibility and an equal utility
constraint arising from free labour migration. In stage 2 the federal agency chooses the corrective
inter-regional transfer to maximise national social welfare. This maximisation is also subject to
feasibility and the equal utility condition. Mobile labour chooses its location in the final stage
conditional on state and federal policies. When making their choices states play Nash, make
their choices simultaneously and correctly anticipate the federal transfer and labour location
choices. In choosing its transfer, the federal agency takes state policies as given and correctly
anticipates labour location choices.
A sub-game perfect equilibrium to the game is then characterised and explained. It is im-
portant for the reader to know that up to this point my analysis is standard and tells us nothing
new about how corrective transfers work in a world of migration externalities. However, what
follows is, I believe, novel, and does advance our knowledge of corrective inter-state transfers,
especially of how they respond to region-specific price shocks. In particular, I examine the ef-
fects of an exogenous increase in the price of local public goods in each region on the equilibrium
transfer chosen by the federal agency. This I do by using the implicit function theorem to derive
an expression which shows how the equilibrium transfer changes in response to increases in the
local public good price in a region. I then show that if two restrictions are satisfied, a region’s
corrective transfer is increasing in its local public good cost, for a given cost in the neighbouring
region. What is more, I am able to demonstrate that these restrictions are automatically satis-
fied if a free migration equilibrium exists, is unique and stable. Finally, I provide an explanation
of what are essentially mathematical results on the transfer response to exogenous price shocks.
My explanation exposes the unique role of migration externalities in causing the directional
relationship between the corrective transfer and changes in regional local public good costs.
The outline is as follows. Section 2 below sets up the efficiency-in-migration model of a
federation. Section 3 solves the Pareto efficient problem for this federation and establishes the
benchmark conditions that must be satisfied for efficiency. Section 4 develops the state-federal
equalisation game and looks at its equilibrium properties, focussing on the transfer chosen by
the federal agency. Section 5 shows, as a backdrop for the results, that the equilibrium transfer
is non-zero since it corrects for various migration externalities. Section 6 develops the key result
in relation to transfers in favour of high cost states while the discussion in Section 7 concludes.
Mathematical details are placed in Annex A and B.
2 Model of a federation
Consider a federal economy with i = 1, 2 states each with a benevolent government providing
a single local public good denoted as Gi. The federation also has a benevolent central agency
which chooses a lump sum inter state transfer, ρ. A given labour supply, N, migrates freely
across states. On the assumption that citizens have homogeneous preferences the analysis is
conducted in terms of a representative person from each state. A citizen also supplies one unit
of labour so N is the (given) labour supply for the federation. Denoting ni as the population
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(labour supply) of state i, for i = 1, 2, the following labour supply constraint must hold:
N = n1 + n2. (2.1)
The production process in each state uses three inputs. One is the mobile labour defined
above. Assuming a competitive labour market it receives a wage, wi, equal to its marginal
product. The second input is foreign-owned capital denoted as ki for i = 1, 2. This input is
assumed to be in fixed supply within each state. It has the same price across states which is
equal to some given world return, r. The remaining input - an un-priced natural resource - is
also in fixed supply within each state. States produce a numeraire using a continuous, increasing
and quasi-concave production technology. Since labour supply is the only variable input this
can be expressed as
fi(ni) i = 1, 2. (2.2)
Supposing the price of the numeraire is one, fi(ni) also defines the value of output. With
diminishing returns to labour:
∂fi(ni)
∂ni
= wi > 0,
∂wi
∂ni
< 0 i = 1, 2. (2.3)
where ∂wi/∂ni is the change in the wage rate (marginal product) as labour supply varies. The
total economic rent generated in state i,
Ri = fi(ni)− wini − rki, i = 1, 2. (2.4)
is the difference between the value of output and the payments to mobile labour and foreign-
owned capital.
The total income accruing to citizens in state i is equal to their wage income and some share,
determined by the parameter 0 6 βi 6 1, of the economic rent generated within the state. This
parameter captures the degree of rent capture in state i for i = 1, 2. This can vary across states
with βi = 0 implying no rent capture - all rents accrue to foreigners - and βi = 1 meaning there
is full rent capture. As shown by Wildasin and Wilson (1998) the burden of local rent capture is
exported to foreigners so one would expect βi = 1. Citizen income in state i is Ii = wini + βiRi
which, using (2.4), is
Ii = (1− βi)wini + βi(fi(ni)− rki) i = 1, 2. (2.5)
In the event that βi = 1 citizens of the state are residual claimants with Ii = fi(ni) − rki. At
the other extreme, if βi = 0 there is no rent capture in state i and citizens earn only their wage
income so that Ii = wini.
A representative citizen of state i has a continuous, quasi concave direct utility function,
ui = xi + v(gi) i = 1, 2. (2.6)
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where xi is per capita consumption of a pure private good and gi is the benefit received from
each unit of the public good produced in state i. It is supposed that the private good price is
given and the same in each state. This can be rationalised by supposing that xi is a traded
good with a given world supply price. For convenience this price is set equal to one. The price
of the local public good is assumed to be given and denoted by ci where i = 1, 2.




i = 1, 2, (2.7)
where α is a congestion parameter assumed to be the same across states. If α = 0, then gi = Gi
and state i provides a pure local public good while if α = 1 we have gi = Gi/ni and state i
provides a pure private good. For alpha between zero and one the state-provided good is mixed.
Note that gi is the choice variable of state i, not Gi.
Define the state government strategy set as g = {g1, g2}. The strategy set for all decision
makers in the federation is then
s = {g, ρ} . (2.8)
Free mobility implies that the following equal utility condition must also be satisfied:
x1 + v(g1) = x2 + v(g2). (2.9)
One can allow for migration costs, but if symmetric, as assumed here, they can be ignored.
Attachment to place can also be incorporated (see Mansoorian and Myers (1993)) though this
does not change the conclusions. Therefore, I proceed without allowing for migration costs or
attachment. This enables the results to be presented with minimal complexity.3
Denote the given per unit cost of the public good as ci where i = 1, 2. The per unit public
good cost can differ across states. This is justified on the basis that local public goods are not
traded goods. Hence, one would not expect price equalisation across states or that local public
good prices would equal some world supply price.
The budget constraint for a state can now be defined as
xini ± ρ− ciGi = fi(ni) i = 1, 2. (2.10)
Per capita private good consumption for state i becomes
xi =
{
(1− βi)wini + βi[fi(ni)− rki]± ρ− ciG
ni
}
i = 12. (2.11)
3Results with attachment to place are available on request.
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Using this, together with n2 = (N − n1) to eliminate n2, the equal utility condition is:{









From the equal utility condition, implicitly, n1 is a function of s = (g, ρ) and one can define
n1 = n1(s). (2.13)
Using the constraint n1 +n2 = N labour supply to state 2 is also, implicitly, a function of state
and federal policies, that is, n2 = n2(s).
3 Pareto efficiency
In this section I explore the first order necessary conditions that support a Pareto optimal
outcome for the federation postulated above. These conditions allow me to assess the efficiency
properties of the policy game between states and the federal agency developed in the next
section. This, in turn, is important for establishing the results of the paper.
The conditions necessary for optimality are derived by invoking the assumption, common in
the fiscal federalism literature, that a mythical central planner can directly choose per capita
private good consumption, local public good provision and the labour supply in each state in
order to maximise utility in either state 1 or state 2, subject to the equal utility constraint,
feasibility and the total labour supply condition. Formally, the planner chooses xi, gi and ni,
for i = 1, 2, to maximise
u1 =
{




subject to the following constraints:
(i) x1 + v(g1) = x2 + v(g2) (3.2)
(ii) n1x1 + n2x2 − c1nα1 g1 − c2nα2 g2 = (1− β1)w1n1 + β1(f1(n1)− rk1)+
(1− β2)w2n2 + β2(f2(n2)− rk2)
(3.3)
(iii) n1 + n2 = N. (3.4)
This is in large part similar to the formulation in Myers (1990), except that in my set up the
planner is constrained to find a solution on the utility possibilities frontier defined between a
citizen of state 1 and her counterpart in state 2 consistent with free migration (equal per capita
utilities). By contrast, in Myers (1990) the equal utility condition is replaced by a constraint
which holds utility in state 2 at some particular level, that is, u2 = u2. With either formulation
the same set of first order necessary conditions for local public good provision and the spatial
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allocation of labour are obtained but my planner solution is constrained to be at the point where
the 45 degree line from the origin intersects with the utility possibilities frontier. In contrast, a
solution which holds state 2 utility at some particular level while maximising per capita utility
in state 1 finds a solution on the frontier consistent with this constraint.
The Lagrangian for the maximisation problem is:
Z = u1(x1, g1) + λ[x1 + v(g1)− x2 − v(g2)]
+λ2 {(1− β1)w1n1 + β1(f1(n1)− rk1) + (1− β2)w2n2 + β2(f2(n2)− rk2)
−n1x1 − n2x2 − c1nα1 g1 − c2nα2 g2]}+ λ3[N − n1 − n2].
(3.5)
Solving yields the following first order necessary conditions for local public good provision and
the supply of labour to each state:
n1−αi vgi = ci (3.6)


















are the social marginal benefits of adding a unit of labour to states 1 and 2 respectively. For
state 1 the social marginal benefit is equal to the marginal product of an extra worker, w1, less
their per capita consumption, x1, plus their impact on the wage income of all citizens captured
by (1−βi)n1(∂w1/∂n1), less their congestion adjusted contribution to the cost of providing the
state’s local public good, αc1G1/n1. The same interpretation applies to state 2.
I conclude here that Pareto optimality requires local public goods to be provided according
to the Samuelson condition, (3.6), and that mobile labour is allocated across states to equate
social marginal benefits, as given by (3.7). In addition, constraints (3.2) to (3.4) must be
satisfied. If these conditions hold the planner’s maximisation yields a solution on the utility
possibilities frontier defined between a representative citizen of state 1 and her counterpart in
state 2 where per capita utilities are equal, output is exhausted by private good and public
service consumption and the federation’s labour force is allocated to each of the two states.
4 State-federal equalisation game
Having established what is necessary for Pareto optimality I now set up a three stage game which
captures the essence of a federation with centrally mandated equalisation and semi-independent
states. In this game, the two states move first to choose their local public good provision
simultaneously while holding Nash conjectures. States correctly anticipate the migration and
inter-state transfer responses to their policies. Hence, they have an incentive to distort their
policies to influence both the transfer and their supply of mobile labour. The federal agency
moves in stage 2 to choose its inter-state transfer for given state policies. It correctly anticipates
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migration responses to its policy choice. Finally, in stage 3 mobile labour makes its location
choice to equate per capita utility conditional on state and federal policies. The game also has
complete information. The following discussion starts with labours’ location choice.
4.1 Stage 3: settlement patterns
For given local public good provision and inter-state transfer the only decision facing citizens in
the final stage is their location consistent with equal per capita utilities. This choice determines
the pattern of settlement for the federation conditional on equilibrium state and federal policies,
s∗ = {g∗, ρ∗}. It is well known that existence of a unique and stable migration equilibrium is
guaranteed if (i) social marginal benefit, µi, is negative for each state; and (ii) social marginal
benefit in a state is decreasing in its labour supply. These restrictions are consistent with the
standard diagram of a free migration equilibrium with N on the horizontal axis and two concave
indirect utility (maximum) value functions intersecting at a unique migration equilibrium with
equal per capita utilities.
4.2 Stage 2: inter-state transfer
Consideration of the federal agency’s problem in stage 2 begins by noting that the equal utility
constraint is also a social welfare function for the federation. With strong incentive equivalence
imposed by free mobility social welfare is maximised by the central agency if it chooses ρ to
maximise per capita utility in either state 1 or 2, for given g1 and g2, subject to the equal utility









subject to (2.1), (2.12) and (2.13).
The reader might wish to compare the federal agency and planner maximisation problems.
Both decision-makers maximise per capita utility in state 1 conditional on feasibility, the equal
utility condition and the total labour supply constraint. However, unlike the planner, the federal
agency cannot directly choose local public good provision or labour supply in each state. Rather,
it is states that now choose the provision of local public goods while mobile labour makes its
own location choices in stage 2 for given state and federal policies. Of course, while the agency
does not directly choose settlement patters, from the relationship at (2.13) it does so indirectly
by manipulating the transfer instrument to achieve a population distribution which maximises
social welfare. As we shall see below, this is sufficient for the agency to replicate, using its
indirect instrument, the spatial efficiency achieved by the planner.
The solution drops out naturally by differentiating (4.1) with respect to ρ and setting the





where µ1 is the social marginal benefit in state 1 from an additional worker and ∂n1/∂ρ is the
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labour supply response to a change in the transfer. Hence, (4.2) equates the social marginal
benefit (to state 1) of an increase in the transfer (to state 2) with the marginal cost which is
equal to one.


























In general, one cannot sign ∂n1/∂ρ. However, in proposition 1 presented later in the paper,
I impose the restriction that the federation is over-populated, namely, µi < 0 for i=1,2. This
implies that D < 0 which means that ∂n1/∂ρ < 0; as the inter-state transfer from state 1 to 2
increases labour migrates out of state 1 to state 2. In other words, workers follow the transfer.
Combining (4.2) and (4.3) yields the first order necessary condition for the inter-state trans-
fer to be µ1 = µ2 where µ1 and µ2 are the social marginal benefits for states 1 and 2 from the
solution to the central planner problem. The social marginal benefit in state 1 can be defined
as a function of the state’s labour supply, that is, µ1(n1), and similarly define µ2(n2). Given
this, the first order necessary condition can be expressed as
F (s) = µ1(n1(s))− µ2(n2(s)) = 0. (4.4)
Although the federal agency cannot directly choose labour supply to each state it uses its
transfer instrument to achieve the same outcome as the planner - equality of social marginal
benefits across states, or spatial efficiency. If it chooses a transfer consistent with (4.4) the
agency maximises (4.1) subject to the set of constraints, for given state policies.
The first order necessary condition is a best response ρ̂ = ρ̂(g) with a solution ρ∗ = ρ̂(g∗)
where g∗ = {g∗1, g∗2} are the levels of local public good provision chosen by states in a Nash
equilibrium to stage 1 of the equalisation game. A solution exists if F (s) is concave in the
inter-state transfer. A set of sufficient conditions which ensure this are provided in Annex A.
4.3 Stage 1: local public good supply
In stage 1 states simultaneously choose their supply of local public goods while correctly antic-










subject to (2.1), (2.12), (2.13) and (4.4), the first order necessary condition adopted by the
federal agency. Differentiating the objective function with respect to g1 yields:












This is analogous to the efficiency condition, (3.6), except for the presence of two terms, ∂n1/∂g1
and ∂ρ/∂g1, which capture the migration and inter-state transfer responses to the choice of g1.
The transfer response term is present because the state takes account of the impact of its choice
of public good on the inter-state transfer; that is, the state acts strategically with respect to
the transfer.
From the equal utility constraint and the first order necessary condition for the inter-state
transfer it is possible to obtain two expressions that show how the labour supply to state 1 and
the inter-state transfer it makes to state 2 change in response to changes in the state’s local


























and D and A are as previously defined.
State 2 chooses g2 to maximise u2 subject to the same set of constraints. This yields





























Absent any restrictions, the signs of the migration and transfer response terms are ambiguous
for both states. What is more, when substituted into (4.6) and (4.9) it is not possible to obtain
the public good efficiency condition, (3.6). It can be concluded that in a Nash equilibrium to
the first stage of the game both states provide their local public goods inefficiently with over or
under provision possible. States manipulate their policies in order to influence the federation’s
settlement patterns and the inter-state transfer chosen by the federal agency and this leads to
inefficient policies. For my purposes, it does not matter whether states provide their local public
goods efficiently, only that some Nash equilibrium exists. Therefore, though interesting in its
own right, this aspect of the problem is not pursued further.
The first order necessary conditions together with the labour supply and transfer responses
are best response functions, ĝ1 = ĝ1(g2) and ĝ2 = ĝ2(g1). A Nash equilibrium to stage 1 of the
game is a solution, g∗ = {g∗1, g∗2}, such that g∗1 = ĝ1(g∗2) and g∗2 = ĝ2(g∗1). It is well know that
existence of a Nash equilibrium is assured in this game if the player payoffs are concave in their
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strategies (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). Annex A derives sufficient conditions ensuring this.
4.4 Equilibrium and efficiency
A sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a solution s∗ = {g∗, ρ∗} such that g∗ = {g∗1, g∗2} is a
Nash equilibrium to stage 1, ρ∗ = ρ̂(g∗) is the optimal inter-state transfer from the second stage
and n∗1 = n̂1(s
∗) and n∗2 = n̂2(s
∗) are optimal labour supplies to states 1 and 2 (respectively)
chosen in the final stage. A SPE exists if the sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium to stage 1, an optimal transfer in stage 2, and a migration equilibrium in stage 3,
hold.
What efficiency properties characterise a SPE for this game? From the planner problem,
local public goods must be provided according to the Samuelson rule and labour should be allo-
cated across states to equate social marginal benefits if a SPE is to be on the utility possibilities
frontier defined between a representative citizen of state 1 and her counterpart in state 2. We
know the federal agency chooses a transfer that achieves an equality of social marginal benefits
but local public services are, as noted previously, over or under-provided. Hence, a SPE is inside
the utility possibilities on the 45 degree line from the origin. For this reason, henceforth the
corrective transfer chosen by the federal agency in stage 2 is referred to as constrained optimal.
5 Migration externalities
The corrective inter-state transfer in a SPE is non-zero because some redistribution of income
across states is required to offset the externalities related to free migration. In their presence,
a SPE is not Pareto optimal without a non-zero inter-state income transfer. Two migration
externalities, one relating to the fiscal effects of a migrant and the other to their impact on
economic rents, are very well known. However, in my model there is also a migration externality
related to the impact of mobility on wage income via changes in the wage rate.
It is useful for the reader to know how and why the constrained optimal transfer is deter-
mined by the inter-state pattern of these transfers. The results in Section 6 cannot be readily
understood without this background. That said, readers familiar with the arguments about
migration externalities and the corrective transfer may wish to proceed directly to Section 6,
without any loss of understanding of the results there.
Proceed by using the definitions of social marginal benefit at (3.7) and per capita consump-































From this, the constrained optimal transfer is a function of three externalities. First of all
there is the well-known (positive) fiscal externality created by a migrant to a state, (ciGi/ni), for
i = 1, 2. This is their contribution to the cost of providing the local public good. The constrained
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optimal transfer is a function of the difference between this externality across states: (c1G1/n1)−
(c2G2/n2), adjusted for congestion. When α = 1 the public good is fully congested and this
difference has no influence on the optimal transfer. However, when α < 1 the constrained
optimal transfer corrects for the difference. If the fiscal externality in state 2 exceeds that in
state 1, then (c1G1/n1) − (c2G2/n2) < 0. If local public goods are not fully congested, this
exerts a positive influence on ρ; thus, the transfer redistributes income towards states with
relatively large fiscal externalities. From the migration responses derived earlier we know that
the constrained optimal transfer will also encourage migration to high fiscal externality states.
The second (negative) externality is the per capita economic rent consumed by a migrant
to a state, Ri/ni, for i = 1, 2, adjusted by the local rent capture parameter. When βi = 1, for
i = 1, 2, there is full rent capture, but when βi = 0 locals capture no economic rent and earn only
their wage income. In this latter case, the difference between per capita rents, (R1/n1−R2/n2)
exerts no influence whatever on the optimal transfer. If local rent capture is non-zero then the
constrained optimal transfer must correct for inter-state differences between per capita rents.
One can see from (5.5) that if state 2 generates higher per capita rent then (R1/n1−R2/n2) < 0;
this exerts a negative influence on ρ. Hence, the optimal transfer redistributes income away
from relatively high rent states.
The remaining externality is new and enters the optimal transfer expression because I have
allowed for variable local rent capture which splits out the effect of a migrant to a state into
its wage income and economic rent effects. The wage income externality only operates when
βi < 1 otherwise the impact of migration on labour income is captured by the rent externality
term. Therefore, let us suppose βi < 0, where i = 1, 2. This means there is less than full rent
capture in both states. Since ∂wi/∂ni < 0, the wage externalities are negative. If the negative
wage income externality in state 2 exceeds that in state 1, this difference exerts a negative effect
on ρ, redistributing income in favour of state 1. Thus, the transfer redistributes income away
from states with a comparatively high negative wage income externality.
One might reasonably argue that in practice the need for a corrective transfer is over-stated
since it is likely that locals capture none of their state’s economic rent and state services are
fully congested pure private goods.4 If this is so, βi = 0 for i=1,2 and α = 1. However, even













The transfer must correct for inter-state differences in the wage income externality. This is why
my results in the next Section apply even when there is no local rent capture and state services
are pure private goods.
4See Oates (1988) for a discussion of empirical estimates of public good congestion.
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6 Transfer response to a public good cost increase
A SPE to the game is conditional on the parameter set ϕ = ∪
i
ϕi where ϕi = {α, ki, r,N, βi, ci}
is the set of parameters in state i for i=1,2. It is possible to analyse how equilibrium choices
respond to changes in any of these parameters. In this Section I focus on two, c1 and c2. In
particular, I wish to see how the equilibrium choices made by players respond to exogenous
increases in local public good prices. Since my focus is on the transfer and labour location
responses to cost increases I ignore the impact on local public good provision. That said we
know states will respond to any cost increase in stage 1 by changing provision of their local
public goods. However, given the timing of moves the federal agency will take these responses
and the resulting levels of public good provision as given. Thus, one can focus on the transfer
best response since any adjustments made by the states to price changes occur in stage 1 and
the agency optimises conditional on these choices. I also assume the federal agency correctly
anticipates how labour location choices respond to changes in the cost of local public goods. As
we shall see, this anticipation plays an important part in determining how the agency changes
its transfer when the prices of local goods change.
The analysis proceeds by considering, first, the effects of an increase in the local public good
cost in state 1 on the constrained optimal transfer. From (4.4) the implicit function theorem

















where ∂n1/∂ρ and A are given to us at (4.3) and H is defined at (4.8). From the equal utility







This expression tells us how the labour supply to state 1 changes when the cost of the local
public good in state 1 changes. It is present in (6.1) because as noted previously the federal
agency correctly anticipates how labour location choices respond to changes in the prices of
local public goods. In general this migration response cannot be signed. However, as is shown
in proposition 1 below it can be signed if one of the restrictions in the proposition holds, namely,
that µi < 0 for i=1,2. In this case labour supply to state 1 is decreasing in c1 since D is negative.
With N fixed a decrease in n1 can only occur if there is migration from state 1 to 2. Thus, an
increase in the cost of the local public good in state 1 leads to migration from state 1 to 2 as
labour moves to the relatively lower cost state.

























The expression is analogous to (6.2) and tells us how the labour supply to state 2 changes in
response to an increase in the cost of the local public good in that state. This too is negative if
µ2 < 0 as supposed in proposition 1. That is, an increase in the cost of the local public good in
state 2 causes outward migration to state 1 as labour seeks the lower cost jurisdiction. As with
a cost increase in state 1, the federal agency correctly anticipates this labour supply response
to a cost increase in state 2.
Expressions (6.1) and (6.3), together with the labour supply responses, (6.2) and (6.4), tell
us how the constrained optimal transfer chosen by the federal agency in stage 2 changes as the
cost of the local public good increases in states 1 and 2 respectively. The following proposition
can now be stated and proved:
Proposition 1. If social marginal benefit, µi, in state i is negative and decreasing in labour
supply, for i = 1, 2, the inter-state transfer received by the state is increasing in its local public
good cost. Thus, as a state’s relative local public good cost increases so too does its transfer.
Proof. Suppose:
(i) µi < 0; (ii)
∂µi
∂ni
< 0 i = 1, 2.
Restriction (i) implies that D < 0. This, in turn, means that ∂ni/∂ci < 0, for i = 1, 2, and







and the proposition is proved.
Are these restrictions plausible from an economic perspective? It turns out they automat-
ically hold if a unique and stable free migration equilibrium exists. To see this, note that the
indirect utility (maximum value) function for a representative citizen in state i in stage 3 of the
game is Vi(ni) = Max
s∗
ui, for i = 1, 2, where s
∗ are equilibrium state and federal policies from















ni + µi. (6.6)
It is well known that for a stable free migration equilibrium to exist requires (i) ∂2ui/∂n
2
i < 0
and (ii) µi < 0 for i=1.2. Per capita indirect utility in each state must be strictly concave
in labour supply and the social marginal benefit of an additional migrant must be negative.
This latter restriction implies the federation is over-populated. If these conditions hold then
from (6.6) it is clear social marginal benefit will also be decreasing in labour supply, that is,
∂µi/∂ni < 0 for i=1,2. Hence, if the sufficient conditions for existence and stability are satisfied
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so too are the restrictions which are sufficient for the transfer to a state to be increasing in its
public good cost. In this sense, the restrictions are highly plausible5.
The mathematical result in proposition 1 is at first sight counter-intuitive for it tells us
that efficiency requires a transfer of income from low to high cost jurisdictions. The following
explanation seems to capture the essence of the idea in the proposition. Consider what happens
to labour location decisions in stage 3 with a higher c1, conditional on some value of c2. For given
state-federal policies and allocation of labour across states, an increase in c1 reduces per capita
(indirect) utility in state 1 relative to state 2. This means that compared to a free migration
equilibrium at the old public good price for state 1, V1(n1) is less than V2(n2). Assuming the
restrictions in proposition 1 hold, a free migration equilibrium can be re-established if labour
migrates from state 1 to 2 until V1(n1) = V2(n2). This is why the sign of ∂n1/∂c1 at (6.2) is
negative. As we would expect, labour will wish to migrate out of the state which has experienced
the cost increase.
However, relative to an equilibrium at the old local public good price for state 1, such a
labour supply response in stage 3 to a higher c1 will also increase µ2 and decrease µ1. Without
a change in the transfer we will have µ1 < µ2 and any resulting free migration equilibrium will
not be Pareto optimal. Hence, in response to a cost increase in state 1 the agency must choose
a smaller ρ, that is, transfer income from state 2 to 1 as a partial offset for the local public
good price increase in state 1. This stops any inefficient migration that would otherwise take
place in response to the cost increase in state 1 - that part related to the migration externalities
identified in the discussion above - but preserves the efficient component. Migration from state
1 to 2 in response to the cost increase in state 1 still occurs in net terms. However, the increased
transfer of income to the state which has experienced the cost increase corrects for that part
of the migration response related to locational externalities. This is why the transfer to state 1
is increasing in c1 as shown in the proposition. An analogous (reverse) argument applies to an
increase in c2 for a given c1.
There is an alternative way of thinking about this. The cost of providing local public goods
in a state can be thought of as a location specific negative externality just like, say, air pollution
or traffic congestion. When a migrant enters a state they must pay their contribution for the
provision of local services. If the price of providing local services goes up then this negative
externality increases and drives labour out of the jurisdiction. However, because of migration-
related fiscal, rent and wage income externalities, too many migrants leave the state and this
necessitates an increased transfer in favour of the state which has experienced an increase in
its local public good cost. The transfer acts as compensation for higher cost to encourage an
optimal number of people to live in the high cost region. Otherwise, labour supply to the high
cost region would be less than is optimal.
Thus, on efficiency grounds the constrained optimal transfer must respond to changes in
local public good prices and in such a way that jurisdictions experiencing cost increases receive
a larger transfer. In this sense the proposition provides an efficiency rationale for inter-state
5Even with the restrictions it is not possible to determine whether local public goods are under or over
provided in equilibrium
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transfers to high cost states to deter inefficient migration in response to exogenous price shocks.
In contrast to the traditional view that such transfers are inefficient, this provides an efficiency
rationale for the direction of transfers one sees in real world equalisation schemes, namely,
transfers from low to high cost regions.
It should also be noted that the result holds even if there is no local rent capture - so rents
do not distort location choices - and local public goods are fully congested - meaning there
are no fiscal externalities. Even in this case a Tiebout world does not emerge as wage income
externalities still distort migration choices requiring a non-zero corrective transfer to achieve
a Pareto optimal outcome. With only this externality distorting migration choices a region’s
transfer is still increasing in its local public good cost.
Finally, proposition 1 applies regardless of the reason why local public good costs increase.
In principle, there could be an exogenous increase in c1 or c2 due to changes in technology,
input prices or factors such as the dispersion, density or remoteness of populations and socio-
demographic features which lead to greater expenditure needs. The result is general in that it
applies to cost increases arising from all of these potential sources.
7 Conclusion
Cost equalisation is a feature of grant design in many countries, including unitary states with
regions, and federations. Most often it is vertical in nature though sometimes it is overtly
horizontal. Regardless, cost equalisation results in the redistribution of income from low to
high cost jurisdictions, usually in the name of equalising fiscal capacities, an equity goal. As
economists, we might view this at first sight as being inefficient: indeed, this seems to be the
prevailing view.
In this paper, I have argued the situation is more complex in a world where free migration
is associated with externalities and a corrective inter-state transfer is required on efficiency
grounds. My contribution has been to show that if a stable, unique, free migration equilibrium
exists, the corrective transfer received by a region is, in fact, increasing in the cost of its local
public good, for a given cost in neighbouring regions. As explained, this result arises because
a part of any migratory response to a cost increase in one region is inefficient and needs to be
corrected for by an increased (compensatory) transfer to the region experiencing higher cost.
It should be pointed out that this would not happen in a Tiebout world where there are no
externalities and the migration response to a cost increase is fully efficient. However, as I have
shown it is difficult for a Tiebout world to emerge in my model. Even when fiscal and rent
externalities are zero there is still a wage income externality to distort migration decisions.
So far as I am aware, this result is also the first efficiency rationale for cost equalisation,
particularly in favour of high cost regions. As discussed in the Introduction, this is exactly
what we see in the practice of fiscal equalisation in a large number of countries. Thus, my paper
provides a bridge between the practice and theory of equalisation and is good news for unitary
and federal countries that operate schemes of cost equalisation embedded within broader fiscal
equalisation programs, or inter-governmental grants.
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Annex A: Second order conditions













The following set of sufficient conditions ensure this is negative:
(i) µi < 0 i = 1, 2 (ii)
∂µi
∂ni






































The following set of sufficient conditions ensure this is negative:
(i) µi < 0 i = 1, 2 (ii)
∂µi
∂ni
< 0 i = 1, 2; (iii)
∂ni
∂gi










< 0 (vii) G1 > 1
An analogous second order condition and set of sufficient conditions hold for state 2.
Annex B: Derivations for section 5









































































































































It is now possible to express the inter-state transfer response to a change in the local public
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